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People v. McGrew (Cal. 1969).

At about 4:00 P.M., June 25, 1967, Kenneth T. McGrew
brought a new, securely locked footlocker to the United Airlines
freight office at Lindbergh Field, San Diego for shipment to San
Francisco. He consigned it to himself,' and stated on the way bill
that it contained books and clothing. He informed the freight
agent that he had another footlocker to ship, and that he was
going to San Francisco on a midnight flight. The United freight
agent, Charles J. Dowling, Jr., suspected that the locker contained
marijuana. His suspicions were apparently based upon
McGrew's appearance, the weight of the locker, and information
that marijuana had been shipped in similar containers. He had
been warned by his supervisor to "be on the alert for footlockers
and suspicious people" and to "check out" any suspected
contraband. After telephoning his supervisor for authorization,
Dowling opened the footlocker by knocking out the hinge pins,
and observed that it contained packages wrapped in newspaper or
brown paper. He did not open any of the packages; however,
because he previously had seen marijuana bricks wrapped in
plastic, he believed the packages contained marijuana. After
closing the locker, Dowling telephoned his supervisor and the
police.
About 5:00 P.M., a San Diego police officer arrived and,
after hearing Dowling describe what had happened, requested to
see the footlocker. Dowling opened it, and the police officer
removed and opened one of the packages. Mr. McLaughlin, a
state narcotics agent,2 arrived, removed and examined the
packages, and determined that they contained marijuana.
1. McGrew used the name "Kent McGraw" in shipping the footlockers, but the fact
that he had used a fictitious name apparently did not come to the attention of officers
until after his arrest.
2. The California Supreme Court erroneously describes Agent McLaughlin as a
federal narcotics agent.
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Dowling notified the other airlines to be on the lookout for
McGrew. About 8:00 P.M., McGrew took a second footlocker to
Western Airlines and consigned it to himself in San Francisco. A
Western Airlines freight agent called Dowling, and the officers
proceeded to Western Airlines to investigate. After depressing the
lid of the footlocker and detecting the odor of marijuana, Agent
McLaughlin requested Western Airlines employees to open it.
They opened it by removing the hinge pins, and Agent
McLaughlin removed its contents, paper-wrapped marijuana
bricks.
At about 11:00 P.M., McGrew bought a ticket to San
Francisco at the Western Airlines counter and checked a suitcase.
Airline employees pointed out McGrew to Agent McLaughlin in
the airport restaurant. McLaughlin and another officer arrested
McGrew, searched him, and recovered the Western Airlines
baggage claim ticket. They retrieved the bag from the luggage
counter, and upon searching it, discovered more marijuana.
The Superior Court of San Diego County granted McGrew's
motion to suppress the evidence, reasoning that the initial search
by Dowling, the United Airlines employee, was conducted solely
for police purposes and in response to police suggestion. The court
concluded that Dowling was acting as a police agent,3 that the
initial search was unlawful, and that this illegal seizure of
contraband led to the other evidence sought to be suppressed and
to the arrest of the defendant.
The district court of appeal reversed, 4 finding that no police
agency existed in the initial search by Dowling since the police had
not requested him to open the footlocker. Whether the suggestion
to be on the alert for such footlockers originated from a police
organization was considered immaterial. The court further
concluded that since private searches are not within the fourth
amendment, it was unnecessary to show that Dowling had
probable cause to search.5 It determined that the police did have
probable cause to search on the basis of the information provided
3. Record at 6-J.
4. People v. McGrew, 75 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1969).
5. The holding that the fourth amendment does not apply to conduct of private
individuals, announced in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), has been subject to
vigorous criticism but was followed recently by the California Supreme Court in People
v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 123, 449 P.2d 230, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1969).
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by Dowling. Having probable cause to search, the police were
excused from obtaining a warrant because the goods were in the
course of transportation.' The search of McGrew's suitcase was
held lawful not only because it was incident to a lawful arrest, but
also because there was probable cause to believe that it contained
contraband.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, held, affirmed
and the opinion of the district court of appeal vacated: exigent
circumstances sufficient to permit a search without a warrant did
not exist, defendant had not consented to search for other than
airline purposes, the airlines did not have authority to consent to
the police search, the police did not reasonably believe the airlines
had such authority, and there was not probable cause to arrest the
defendant.7 People v. McGrew, 1 Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d 665, 69
Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
I.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

PERMITTING A WARRANTLESS

SEARCH

In determining that the searches without warrant were not
excused, the court cited People v. 4Iarshall' in which it delineated
the circumstances permitting warrantless searches. These
circumstances are as follows: (1) the search must be incident to a
lawful arrest; or (2) there must be a danger of imminent
destruction, removal or concealment of the property intended to
be seized, or a probability of a material change in the situation
during the time necessary to obtain a search warrant.' In
Marshall, the court was concerned specifically with the search of
a dwelling, but in McGrew it held that the Marshall requirements
applied equally to the search of effects. 0
The court of appeals held that the rule permitting a
warrantless search of automobiles applied to freight or baggage
6. 75 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The court of appeal cited Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.

132 (1925), where it was held that an automobile or other vehicle can be searched without
a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband. In Carroll, the
Court distinguished the search of a structure from the search of a ship, boat, wagon, or

automobile where it is not practicable t6 secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Id.
at 153.
7. People v. McGrew, I Cal. 3d 404,462 P.2d 1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
8. 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
9. Id. at 61, 442 P.2d at 671, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 591.

10. 1 Cal. 3d at 409,462 P.2d at 4, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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in transit. However, permitting the search of a vehicle without a
warrant is based upon the danger that the vehicle might be moved
before a warrant can be obtained."1 In reversing the court of
appeal on this point, the McGrew court pointed out that the
footlockers were in the custody of the airlines, apparently safe
from imminent destruction, concealment or removal;12 thus the
rationale upon which the automobile exception is based was
inapplicable.
Given probable cause, it would appear that a warrantless
search would have been justified under Marshall if McGrew had
attempted to reclaim the footlockers or if the airlines had
attempted to ship them to San Francisco, since in either case there
would have been an imminent danger of removal. Moreover, it
should not be necessary for the police to seize the footlockers
while awaiting a warrant. The airlines certainly have an
independent interest in refusing to ship what they believe to be
contraband. Knowlingly aiding in the transportation of marijuana
is a criminal act; 1 3 the airlines have no contractual duty to
transport goods in violation of the law; and to suggest that airline
refusal to engage in a criminal shipment could be considered an
unlawful seizure, even if the police suggested that the goods
contained contraband, would appear preposterous. 4
Under the circumstances of McGrew, it seems clear that a
search without a warrant was not excusable under Marshall
standards. The court's holding in this respect was entirely
consistent with prior California law, and does not appear to
impose an undue burden on law enforcement.
II.

CONSENT TO SEARCH

The People contended, inter alia, that by shipping his
baggage subject to tariff conditions granting authority to inspect,
11.

See note 6 supra.
12. i Cal. 3d at 409-10, 462 P.2d at 4-5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
13. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11530-31 (West 1955).
14. The court pointed out that the carrier had no contractual duty to ship the
packages before a warrant could be obtained. In Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th
Cir. 1967), an airline freight manager opened and examined the contents of a package after
federal agents had advised him that information on the way bill was erroneous. He
discovered pornographic films and called the agents. After the agents viewed the films, they
advised the agent to lock them up while they obtained a warrant. The court concluded that
the airline had a legitimate interest in examining the packages to determine whether the
contents were fit for carriage. The court apparently assumed the carrier had no duty to
ship goods that were not "fit for carriage." Id. at 581.
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McGrew had consented to the search of his baggage."1 It was
asserted that he had no "reasonable expectation of privacy"
under the standard of Katz v. United States.6 Since he voluntarily
delivered the footlockers into the custody of the airlines, stated the
contents, and gave the airlines limited authority to search the
footlockers, there was no "reasonable" expectation that the
contents would remain private: thus a search for any purpose was
not unreasonable, or violative of the fourth amendment. 7
Similarly, it was argued that one's subjective desire that the
search not be conducted should not be controlling if consent to
search has been granted.
Initially, the court impliedly doubted that McGrew had
consented to any search when it noted that the tariff provision
purporting to grant the right to search was not expressed in the
document which he signed, but only was incorporated by
reference. Its rejection of the owner's consent theory was not
based on the proposition that he had not consented to any search,
however. Instead, the court applied the reasoning of Stoner v.
California" and examined the scope of the consent. It concluded
that the consent, if any, was for the airlines to inspect for airline
purposes. Any search by other than airline personnel or for
purposes other than those for which the airlines might reasonably
be expected to search could not be considered to have been
consented to by the shipper. In the court's view, the airlines could
reasonably be expected to inspect only for safety purposes or to
insure that goods were not overvalued or going at a lower tariff
rate than they should20
It is clear that one may contractually consent to a search, 2'
but consent must be knowing and intentional.2 2 It is doubtful
whether McGrew was aware of the tariff provision permitting
15. Brief for Appellant in Reply at 3-16, People v. McGrew, I Cal. 3d 404, 462 P.2d
1, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1969).
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. The court construed the People's argument as involving a waiver of foirth
amendment rights. 1 Cal. 3d at 411,462 P.2d at 5, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
18. Id. at 410 n.3, 462 P.2d at 5 n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 477 n.3.
19. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
20. See I Cal. 3d at 412, 462 P.2d at 6, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
21. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1945).
22. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95

(9th Cir. 1965).
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airline inspection of shipments,23 and it is certainly unlikely that
he intended to give his consent to a police search of his
footlockers. Thus, the holding that he had not consented to a
police search is entirely consistent with Stoner and similar cases 4
The People's contention that McGrew did not have a

reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of his
footlocker is logical, but somewhat strained. In order to show that

McGrew did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, it
would appear necessary to show that he intended to expose the
contents of the lockers to public view or, that by shipping them,
he was likely to expose them to public view.5 In the absence of a
showing that some significant percentage of containers are

routinely inspected, it is reasonable for one to expect that his
baggage will not be inspected. It is not surprising that the court

attached little weight to this argument.26
III.

THIRD PARTY CONSENT TO SEARCH

Citing People v. Hill7 for the proposition that the police
search would have been lawful if the police had reasonably and
23. In March 1970, the writer observed a sign approximately 3 feet by 2 feet at the
United Airlines passenger desk at Lindbergh Field indicating "Passengers and Baggage
Subject to Search under-Federal Laws-FAA Safety Regulations." No such sign was
in evidence at the United freight office, and it is not known how long the sign has been at
the passenger counter. Each counter has a small sign indicating that tariff regulations are
available for inspection.
24. The court also relied on Comgold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966),
another airline search case in which the initial search of packages by airline employees was
in the presence of and at the specific request of government agents. This was characterized
as a government search.
25. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court, in stressing that the
fourth amendment protects people, not places, pointed out:
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
Id. at 351-52.
26. In the event that airlines do begin inspecting all shipments for concealed bombs,
it would appear that shipping anything by air would be "knowingly" exposing it to the
public. See Frick, Gordon & Patterson, Aircraft Hijacking: Civil and Criminal Aspects,
22 U. FLA. L. REv. 72 (1969), for an interesting discussion of measures currently
implemented and planned to detect weapons and explosives on airlines.
27. 69 Cal. 2d 550, 446 P.2d 521, 72 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1968). Hill involved a case of
mistaken identity. The police arrested another, whom they reasonably believed to be Hill,
in Hill's apartment. They made a search incident to the arrest obtaining evidence
incriminating Hill. The search was held reasonable although it was conceded that the good
faith mistake rule was subject to criticism.
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in good faith believed the airlines had authority to consent to the
search, the court concluded that in McGrew such belief was not
reasonable.
In McGrew, the court amplified the rule of Hill. For the
police belief to be reasonable, "there must be some objective
evidence of joint control or access to the places or items to be
searched which would indicate that the person authorizing the
search has authority to do so. '28 The good faith mistake rule does
not apply where the third party makes clear that the property
belongs to another or where the relationship of the parties is such
that it is clear that the owner of the property has not authorized
the third party to act as his agent 2 9 The court concluded that since
the police had no reason to believe that the shipper had authorized
the airline employee to turn the trunk over to the police, they had
no reasonable, good faith belief in his authority to consent to their
search.
Practically speaking, McGrew would appear to bar any third
party consent to search unless the third party has actual legal
authority or unless the police are mistaken as to the factual
interrelationship between the third party, the defendant, and the
place or thing to be searched. Thus, a mistake as to the legal effect
of the relationship, which the police apparently made in this case,
will not make third party consent effective. On the other hand, a
reasonable though mistaken belief that the consenting party is the
defendant or that the third party is the owner of the item searched
would meet the test.
To the extent that the court's test of reasonableness induces
police to obtain warrants in doubtful cases, it provides helpful
guidance. To the extent that it may bar relevant evidence by
classifying a mistake of law as unreasonable, it is unfortunate.
The exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment is designed to
deter unlawful conduct." The exclusion of relevant evidence is a
harmful result flowing from the application of the rule.3I To apply
the rule when it does not deter and when the police reasonably
28.
29.
30.
31.

1 Cal. 3d at 412,462 P.2d at 6, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
Id. at 413, 462 P.2d at 7, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
Id. at 216.
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believe their conduct is lawful so that it excludes relevant evidence
2
appears to serve no useful purpose
IV.

PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST

The court's discussion of circumstances permitting a
warrantless search was apparently based on the assumption that

the police had probable cause sufficient to obtain a valid warrant
to search the footlocker shipped with United Airlines; however,

the information which the police had was held not to provide
probable cause for his arrest. The court noted that the only
untainted incriminating information which the police had was the

weight of the footlocker and the knowledge that it contained
packages wrapped in brown paper or newspaper.3 3 The court

considered this information consistent with McGrew's statement
that the footlocker contained books and clothing.l Unfortunately,
the court did not say definitely whether there was probable cause
for the initial search, and one is left to speculate whether a

warrant obtained for the first police search based upon this same
information would have been valid.
The standard of probable cause for search is approximately

the same as that for arrest, 35 and in doubtful cases, the weighing
by a judicial officer is required3 It is reasonable to speculate that
if a magistrate, rather than the police, had made the
determination of probable cause, the court would have accepted

that determination. However, the opinion is not helpful in this
regard.
32. See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 38889 (1964), wherein it is stated:
The rule is unsupportable as a reparation or compensatory dispensation to the
injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the experience of its
indispensability in 'exertjing] general legal pressures to secure obedience to the
Fourth Amendment on the part of. . . law-enforcing officers.' [T]he rule is
a needed, but grudgingly taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed
than is needed to combat the disease.
(Citations omitted.)
33. Although the initial search by Dowling may have been wrongful, the information
obtained thereby was not in violation of the fourth amendment. See note 5 supra.
34. The footlocker weighed 112 pounds. It was admitted that a locker filled with twothirds clothing and one-third books would weigh about the same. 1 Cal. 3d at 407, 462
P.2d at 2-3, 82'Cal. Rptr. at 474. The court noted that the packages could have been
wrapped books. Id. at 414, 462 P.2d at 7, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
35. People v. Govea, 235 Cal. App. 2d 285, 296,45 Cal. Rptr. 253, 260 (1965).
36. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1959).
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THE PRIVATE SEARCH

The trial court's order to suppress was based squarely on the
holding that Dowling, the United Airlines employee, was acting
as a police agent when he initially opened the footlocker The
district court of appeal specifically overruled this holding3 8 The
California Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide the
issue, and it is not clear what view the court would adopt. The
reasoning upon which the holding regarding consent to search is
based raises the inference that the court did consider Dowling a
police agent: It suggests that "airline purposes" are limited to
inspections for aircraft safety or tariff violations "where a danger
or inconsistency [is] observed. '3 9 A search for contraband is
characterized as "totally unrelated to the interests of the
airlines."4 0 If a search for contraband is unrelated to airline
interests and is not made for airline purposes, then logically, it is
conducted for police purposes. A logical, although not inevitable,
next step is to reason that one who conducts a search for police
purposes rather than private purposes should be considered a
police agent. In Stoner v. California, the United States Supreme
Court cautioned against the application of strained concepts of
agency in finding authority for consent to search." It would
appear equally important to avoid applying strained concepts to
find police agency.
VI.

CONCLUSION

McGrew is an unsatisfying case because it provides less
guidance than it might have in the areas of probable cause, third
party consent to search, and private parties as police agents, and
it further accentuates the uncertainty surrounding the law of

search and seizure. The airlines, in particular, are given little
guidance as to what they should do if they suspect an individual
is attempting to ship contraband. McGrew does repeat, with
unmistakable clarity, the admonition to law enforcement agencies
that the right way to conduct a search is with a search warrant.
HARLEY MAYFIELD
37. See note 3 supra.

38. "Whether the suggestion airlines be on the alert for such footlockers originated
from the police is immaterial. . . . The police do not necessarily make agents of citizens
they warn concerning crimes." 75 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
39. 1 Cal. 3d at 412, 462 P.2d at 6, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
40. Id.
41. 376 U.S. at488.

